Frequently Asked Questions
The Lab
What is Bonca Lab?
Bonca Lab (boncalab.com) is a research platform with a website run by Dr Mateusz A. Bonca.
Its main topics are blockchain governance, tokenisation, regulatory sandboxes, trust in transactions, and AI in finance and law. The Lab aims to make research on these topics accessible to researchers and business leaders and to initiate scientific discussion.
Sources: information provided by the author (25 October 2026); Bonca Lab: https://www.boncalab.com/
What does Bonca Lab publish?
Bonca Lab presents the scientific publications of Dr Mateusz A. Bonca in its Deep research section.
His scientific activity dates back to the early 2000s. The Deep research articles are scientific publications that went through traditional peer review. They have appeared, among others, in Studia i Materiały (2026), e-mentor (2025), Krytyka Prawa (2024), Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny (2026), Transformacje (2024), Nauki Ekonomiczne (2025) and a monograph published by Akademia Handlowa Nauk Stosowanych w Radomiu (2026). Knowledge bites entries are signed “Bonca | Lab”.
Sources: Bonca Lab – Deep research: https://www.boncalab.com/deep-research; Bonca Lab – Knowledge bites: https://www.boncalab.com/knowledge-bites; information provided by the author (25 October 2026)
Who runs Bonca Lab?
Bonca Lab is run by Dr Mateusz A. Bonca, a business leader and researcher working on emerging topics, from Islamic finance to blockchain governance.
He has over two decades of international executive and consulting experience across Europe, the Middle East and Africa. He has been involved in the theory and practice of cryptoeconomics for many years. His current research focuses on blockchain governance, trust and the tokenisation of the economy.
“This body of work bridges management, economics, and technology - bringing a practitioner's lens to questions that are reshaping how we think about governance, intermediation, and value exchange.” – Dr Mateusz A. Bonca, Bonca Lab (“Principal researcher”)
Sources: Bonca Lab – Principal researcher: https://www.boncalab.com/principal-researcher; Bonca (2025), e-mentor, p. 86: https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716
What is Dr Mateusz A. Bonca's academic background?
Dr Mateusz A. Bonca received his PhD in Economics from Kozminski University (Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie) in 2009.
He graduated from the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) and also studied at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco. He has published more than a dozen papers on innovative topics, including the monograph “Islamskie instrumenty finansowe” (Islamic Financial Instruments, Warsaw 2010). He has spoken at many international and national academic and industry conferences as a panellist, presenter and moderator. Further details are available in his ORCID record: 0009-0002-1529-5692.
Sources: information provided by the author (25 October 2026); Bonca Lab – Principal researcher: https://www.boncalab.com/principal-researcher; Bonca (2025), e-mentor, p. 86: https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-1529-5692
What business experience does Dr Mateusz A. Bonca have?
Since 2020 Dr Mateusz A. Bonca has led Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) in Poland, managing the company’s local advisory business and overseeing the EMEA Centre of Excellence (status as of 25 October 2026).
From 2016 to 2019 he was President, and earlier Vice President, of the Management Board of Grupa LOTOS S.A. Between 2012 and 2016 he was a Director at Deutsche Bank AG in Frankfurt, and from 2010 to 2012 he led consulting teams at Peppers and Rogers Group in the Middle East. From 2004 to 2010 he worked at McKinsey & Company, delivering projects across various industries in over a dozen countries on four continents. He has led transformation programmes in Poland as well as in Germany, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, South Africa and Turkey.
Sources: Bonca Lab – Principal researcher: https://www.boncalab.com/principal-researcher; information provided by the author (25 October 2026); Bonca (2024), Transformacje, p. 180: http://e-transformations.com/archiwum_transformacje/2024/12/20241230140113994.pdf
Is Bonca Lab independent? Who funds it?
All research published by Bonca Lab is financed solely by Dr Mateusz A. Bonca; no employer, sponsor or other third party funds it.
Dr Mateusz A. Bonca declares that all his publications express his personal views and not the position of any organisation or institution he was or is associated with.
Source: information provided by the author (25 October 2026)
Insight: Real estate tokenisation and the role of intermediaries
Can blockchain tokenisation really eliminate intermediaries from real estate investment?
Not fully: Bonca (2026, Studia i Materiały) finds that the full removal of intermediaries (agencies, notaries, courts) from real estate tokenisation remains a proposal, as disintermediation is being replaced by reintermediation.
Its extent depends on legal, organisational, political and technological factors. Notaries, land and mortgage register courts, law firms and property appraisers still perform intermediary functions, while tokenisation platforms, token issuers and operators, and token exchanges partly replace real estate agents. Investors buy tokens directly from the issuer, but the whole system is operated by an ecosystem of digital intermediaries.
Limitations: The phenomenon is still in its early stages, and practical outcomes for specific properties remain unclear.
“The work shows that the proposed disintermediation is currently being replaced by reintermediation. New intermediaries are taking over roles of traditional agents, while traditional intermediaries still retain some functions.” – Bonca (2026), p. 49
Source: Disintermediation From the Perspective of Real Estate Token Economics [in Polish, with an English abstract], Studia i Materiały (2026): https://doi.org/10.7172/1733-9758.2026.44.3
What are the main risks for investors buying real estate tokens?
Bonca (2026, Studia i Materiały) finds that the absence of state control at the offer-preparation stage creates strong threats for investors, who rarely inspect the property because offers are global.
Instead of a legally regulated prospectus, investors rely on white papers and roadmaps, which are not legally standardised; the white paper is primarily a marketing and sales document. The valuation behind the token value need not be a formal appraisal report, and public real-time token valuation sources are lacking. The law has no effective built-in consumer-protection tools in a decentralised network, so what remains is trust in the private firm that prepared the documentation.
Limitations: The study does not include detailed case studies or analyses of token trading on exchanges.
“Każdy, kto kupuje token musi wierzyć w tych pośredników.” (“Everyone who buys a token has to trust these intermediaries.”) – Bonca (2026), p. 56
Source: Disintermediation From the Perspective of Real Estate Token Economics [in Polish, with an English abstract], Studia i Materiały (2026): https://doi.org/10.7172/1733-9758.2026.44.3
Does owning a real estate token mean owning the property?
Not at present: Bonca (2024, Transformacje) finds that a real estate token does not transfer ownership rights but only digitally certifies a fractional share in the right held by the issuing entity (status as of 2024).
Bonca (2024) notes that ownership of a fraction would still require a notarial deed, entries in the land and mortgage register and other mandatory registers, a bank transfer, tax payment and insurance. Bonca (2026, Studia i Materiały) adds that in Poland tokens can currently only represent shares in special purpose companies that remain the owners, and that a token neither replaces a notarial deed nor is a basis for a land register entry (status as of 2026).
Limitations: Bonca (2026) analyses only the currently legally permissible version of tokenisation, not its target vision.
“Currently, the token does not transfer ownership rights, it only digitally certifies the fractional share in the right held by the entity issuing the tokens.” – Bonca (2024), p. 164
Sources: From Kudurru to Token. The Real Estate Market's Path to Tokenization, Transformacje (2024): http://e-transformations.com/archiwum_transformacje/2024/12/20241230140113994.pdf; Disintermediation From the Perspective of Real Estate Token Economics [in Polish, with an English abstract], Studia i Materiały (2026): https://doi.org/10.7172/1733-9758.2026.44.3
What can ancient land records teach us about real estate tokenisation?
Bonca (2024, Transformacje) compares tokens with the kudurru – Mesopotamian stone stelae documenting royal land grants – and finds that the values crucial in real estate have not changed for millennia.
These values are security, transparency, certainty, credibility thanks to a third party, preservation of conventional forms and state participation. The kudurru drew legitimacy from belief in the gods' "mediation", which the paper compares with today's belief in the reliability of codes and algorithms. Blockchain preserves certainty and transparency but treats the participation of state institutions as unnecessary.
Limitations: The historical analysis is limited to the oldest documented forms of recording real estate ownership.
“The mythologized "power" of a dispersed community and belief in algorithms resembles the myth of the power of deities on a stele.” – Bonca (2024), p. 169
Source: From Kudurru to Token. The Real Estate Market's Path to Tokenization, Transformacje (2024): http://e-transformations.com/archiwum_transformacje/2024/12/20241230140113994.pdf
Will states give up control over real estate transactions to blockchain?
Probably not: Bonca (2024, Transformacje) concludes that, contrary to the opinions of optimists, it seems the political power controlling real estate since ancient Babylon will not willingly hand that control to an anonymous chain of blocks.
Tokenisation depends on political and economic power centres, on social endorsement in democracies and on whether law can be "built into" programming code. Judicial authorities keeping land and mortgage registers will probably be reluctant in any political phase, authorities in many countries and banks are quite sceptical, and notaries would probably be dissatisfied. It is not certain whether real estate tokenisation will remain ephemeral or take over the market.
Limitations: The economic effects of these changes have not yet been estimated or examined.
“Currently, tokens do not change any rules for purchasing real estate but are only a manifestation of the hybridization of the economy - a new investment route has been created - through a business entity issuing tokens.” – Bonca (2024), p. 173
Source: From Kudurru to Token. The Real Estate Market's Path to Tokenization, Transformacje (2024): http://e-transformations.com/archiwum_transformacje/2024/12/20241230140113994.pdf
Trust in blockchain transactions
What shapes trust in blockchain transactions?
Bonca (2025, e-mentor) identifies five groups of factors that shape trust in blockchain transactions: technological, economic, political, legal and socio-psychological.
The study finds that on public blockchains the sources of trust differ from traditional ones: trust in technology, social trust, self-trust and trust in "hidden" entities – the experts who build token models, smart contracts and platforms. Politics, law and social phenomena can act both as catalysts and as barriers to that trust.
Limitations: The study covers only public, decentralised blockchains.
“The tokenisation of the economy is changing the foundations of trust in transactions.” – Bonca (2025), p. 83
Source: Will Tokenisation of the Economy Change the Foundations of Trust in Transactions? Selected Issues in the Context of Decentralised Public Blockchain Networks, e-mentor (2025): https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716
Will blockchain replace trust in the state and the law?
No: Bonca (2025, e-mentor) finds that the traditional foundations of trust, formally based on the state and law, will not be significantly altered but only enriched with new content.
The most likely scenario is hybridisation, in which old and new trust institutions share responsibilities according to the type of transaction. The paper cites European Social Survey 2024 data for 24 democratic countries: 45.2% of respondents had little trust in the law and 5.7% had none. Public blockchains will not shift trust towards faith in technology until tight legal mechanisms against online crime are established.
Limitations: The author notes that forecasting is inherently risky, as the industry is at an early stage.
“Rather than diminishing the importance of state authority for the security of blockchain transactions, new technologies will instead foster a new, hybrid, multi-layered type of trust. Politics, law and public awareness, alongside technology, will serve as the foundations of trust in transactions.” – Bonca (2025), p. 84
Source: Will Tokenisation of the Economy Change the Foundations of Trust in Transactions? Selected Issues in the Context of Decentralised Public Blockchain Networks, e-mentor (2025): https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716
What should policymakers do to increase trust in blockchain transactions?
Bonca (2025, e-mentor) argues that trust will grow if innovation policy becomes stable and predictable, technological freedom is promoted and the state supports innovation through pilot projects, grants, tax exemptions and regulatory sandboxes.
Law would catalyse trust through friendly, liberal regulation reducing manipulation, fraud and money laundering, global principles of legal cooperation, and blockchain-based arbitration clauses in smart contracts. The study also treats public awareness as an often underestimated pillar of trust and calls for systematic education, media popularisation and blockchain projects implemented by state institutions, banks, corporations and startups.
Limitations: Technological and economic factors largely remain outside the study's scope.
Source: Will Tokenisation of the Economy Change the Foundations of Trust in Transactions? Selected Issues in the Context of Decentralised Public Blockchain Networks, e-mentor (2025): https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716
Regulatory sandboxes
Who really benefits from regulatory sandboxes – innovators or regulators?
Primarily regulators: Bonca et al. (2024, Krytyka Prawa) conclude that the main function of sandboxes is to help legislators and regulators learn how to design optimal regulatory frameworks for innovation.
Testing regulatory conditions for specific innovations – the function for the economy – is secondary, although online marketing of sandboxes suggests otherwise. A third important function is active dialogue between regulators and entrepreneurs. The authors combine an economist's and a legal theorist's perspective and reconstruct the model of the Polish energy-law sandbox (status as of 2024).
Limitations: The paper examines one model in depth – the Polish energy-law sandbox – rather than comparing countries.
“Oceniając rozwiązania prawne i dotychczasowe próby, za podstawową, główną funkcję uznajemy więc – zdobycie przez prawodawcę i regulatorów wiedzy, w jaki sposób należy projektować optymalne ramy regulacyjne (proceduralne i nadzorcze) dla innowacji.” (“Assessing the legal solutions and attempts to date, we therefore consider the basic, main function to be the acquisition by the legislator and regulators of knowledge on how to design optimal regulatory frameworks (procedural and supervisory) for innovation.”) – Bonca et al. (2024), p. 299
Source: Regulatory Sandboxes – Two Perspectives [in Polish, with an English abstract], Krytyka Prawa (2024): https://doi.org/10.7206/kp.2080-1084.713
Do regulatory sandboxes actually lead to changes in the law?
Not necessarily: Bonca et al. (2024, Krytyka Prawa) find that even after correct tests and a regulator's call for legal change, success is uncertain, because no path has been designed from the final report to a draft law.
In the Polish energy-law model, the regulator may amend its own regulations, propose legislative changes, suggest only interpretive changes – or take no action at all (status as of 2024). Outcomes depend largely on the regulator's professionalism, commitment and political will and, ultimately, on the legislator. The authors ask whether conditions should be set early that, once met, would oblige the regulator to begin legal corrections.
Limitations: Sandboxes have existed only for a few years, so systematic, in-depth research on them is lacking.
“Nie zaprojektowano żadnej drogi od raportu końcowego do projektu ustawy, wobec czego wyniki mogą zniknąć w szufladach urzędników.” (“No path has been designed from the final report to a draft law, so the results may disappear in officials' drawers.”) – Bonca et al. (2024), p. 299
Source: Regulatory Sandboxes – Two Perspectives [in Polish, with an English abstract], Krytyka Prawa (2024): https://doi.org/10.7206/kp.2080-1084.713
What are the risks of regulatory sandboxes – lobbying and unequal treatment?
Bonca et al. (2024, Krytyka Prawa) note that besides testing regulation (an overt function), a sandbox can be used to lobby for legal solutions that a specific entrepreneur needs (a covert function).
Economically, sandboxes face allegations of privileged treatment that limits competition, breaches the equality of businesses and blurs public and private interests. They can also become platforms of controlled, transparent lobbying based on jointly tested "live" solutions. Equality is not violated if the experiment is transparent and public, its conditions precisely regulated and its risk proportional to expected benefits.
Limitations: Effects on legal certainty require a detailed analysis of each sandbox's legal basis and rules.
Source: Regulatory Sandboxes – Two Perspectives [in Polish, with an English abstract], Krytyka Prawa (2024): https://doi.org/10.7206/kp.2080-1084.713
What problems besides regulation do blockchain projects face in regulatory sandboxes?
Bonca (2025, Nauki Ekonomiczne), analysing cohort I of the European Blockchain Regulatory Sandbox (20 projects selected from 90 submitted), finds that implementation barriers have economic, managerial and socio-cultural sources, not only legal and regulatory ones.
Common challenges included difficult public–private cooperation, communication and trust problems in multicultural, interdisciplinary teams, resistance to changes in innovation management, high implementation costs, and threats at the border of cyberspace and reality. The author states that this is the first analysis of the cohort's results in economic literature.
Limitations: Only the public results are analysed; confidential results are available to participants only.
“The analysis of innovations from cohort I (20 projects selected from 90 submitted) proved that observing blockchain economic innovations in regulatory sandboxes is not only a task for lawyers (legislators and regulators), but also for economists and management specialists interested in the digital economy.” – Bonca (2025), p. 181
Source: Do regulatory sandboxes reveal other problems of economic innovations than regulatory ones? Based on the analysis of the results of the European Blockchain Regulatory Sandbox 2023/2024 [in Polish, with an English abstract], Nauki Ekonomiczne (2025): https://doi.org/10.19251/ne/2025.41(10)
How could the European Blockchain Sandbox be made more useful for implementing projects?
Bonca (2025, Nauki Ekonomiczne) recommends supplementing the sandbox's regulatory results with a document on stakeholders' needs and interests and on boundary problems between blockchain and reality, because a trust deficit and communication problems were observed.
It could include at least a relationship matrix of strategic partners, a stakeholder map and profiles of key partners. Stakeholder analysis proves extremely important when implementing blockchain solutions. According to company websites, most cohort-I projects are being implemented and many already operate (status as of 30 June 2025).
Limitations: The paper did not compare sandbox results with company offers.
“Piaskownice regulacyjne Blockchain są skutecznym narzędziem wspomagającym innowacje blockchainowe w gospodarce.” (“Blockchain regulatory sandboxes are an effective tool supporting blockchain innovation in the economy.”) – Bonca (2025), p. 194
Source: Do regulatory sandboxes reveal other problems of economic innovations than regulatory ones? Based on the analysis of the results of the European Blockchain Regulatory Sandbox 2023/2024 [in Polish, with an English abstract], Nauki Ekonomiczne (2025): https://doi.org/10.19251/ne/2025.41(10)
On-chain governance and regulation
Can a government sanction open-source code? What did the Tornado Cash case show?
Not in the Tornado Cash case: Bonca (2026, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny) shows that the 2022 attempt by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to treat immutable smart contracts as sanctionable "property" was unsuccessful.
OFAC, part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, sanctioned Tornado Cash in August 2022; on 26 November 2024 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that OFAC had exceeded its statutory authority, and in March 2025 the sanctions were lifted (status as of November 2025). Tracing ten key events from 2019 to 2025, the study finds that legal regulation of decentralised protocols has many loopholes, depends on the political climate and lacks a coherent doctrine.
“It is indisputable that such a tool has no specific owner under U.S. law.” – Bonca (2026), p. 44
External reference: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Case 23-50669 (2024), as quoted in Bonca (2026), p. 40: "these immutable smart contracts are not “property” under the word’s common, ordinary meaning or under OFAC definitions" – https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
Source: On-Chain Governance and Economic Sanctions Against Privacy-Preserving Software Code: The Tornado Cash Case, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny (2026): https://doi.org/10.31743/ppe.19293
Are developers liable for crimes committed with their decentralised software?
It is uncertain: Bonca (2026, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny) finds that the decisive factors are proof of the developers' direct or potential intent and whether they had a financial interest in illegal transactions.
Mere negligence in code security may create civil but, in most jurisdictions, not criminal liability, and using privacy-enhancing tools is not in itself a crime in most legal systems. The Dutch ruling against developer A. Pertsev (May 2024; 64 months in prison) rejected the defence that a developer merely writes open-source code, signalling a shift in European jurisprudence towards developer accountability. In the U.S., R. Storm was found guilty on 6 August 2025 of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmission business, with no verdict on the money laundering and sanctions conspiracy charges (status as of November 2025).
Limitations: The author treats these answers as tentative; a retrial on the deadlocked charges remained possible.
Source: On-Chain Governance and Economic Sanctions Against Privacy-Preserving Software Code: The Tornado Cash Case, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny (2026): https://doi.org/10.31743/ppe.19293
Is on-chain governance really decentralised if large token holders decide?
Bonca (2026, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny) leaves this open: whether "whales" holding many tokens in a "one token, one vote" model are the real "authority" – and thus whether such governance is decentralised – remains ambiguous.
The study notes that in CFTC v. Ooki DAO (2022) the court classified a DAO as a general partnership with joint and several liability, and that the SEC's emerging doctrine holds that token concentration among founders may negate claims of decentralisation (status as of November 2025). Approaches nevertheless remain fragmented and inconsistent across jurisdictions.
Limitations: Off-chain governance is outside the scope of the study.
“The above case illustrates that decentralised, public blockchain platforms remain a contentious field of experimentation. They are not, in fact, as secure and trustworthy as cybereconomy enthusiasts often believe.” – Bonca (2026), p. 43
Source: On-Chain Governance and Economic Sanctions Against Privacy-Preserving Software Code: The Tornado Cash Case, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny (2026): https://doi.org/10.31743/ppe.19293
AI in the financial sector
How are criminals using generative and agentic AI against investors and financial institutions?
Bonca (2026, book chapter) shows that generative and agentic AI tools used in finance are dual-use: the same automated tools are simultaneously exploited by criminals.
Financial DNA profiling can help criminals run personalised attacks that are nearly impossible to detect by traditional security systems. Criminals impersonate robo-advisors and use synthetic identities, deepfakes and fabricated biometric data to open fraudulent accounts and launder money. Malicious tools such as WormGPT and FraudGPT lower the barrier to entry into cybercrime to almost zero.
Limitations: The chapter does not cover traditional, reactive AI in finance.
“Thus, the same technology that enables the democratisation of financial services is also becoming a source of professionalisation of cybercrime, leading to the phenomenon of vulnerability transfer and the development of CaaS (Crime-as-a-Service).” – Bonca (2026), p. 116
Source: The dual nature of generative AI and agentic AI tools in the financial sector, in: E. Żuchowska-Kotlarz, M. Mostowska, M. Majewska (eds.), Państwo, prawo i gospodarka w epoce transformacji technologicznej. Instytucje, bezpieczeństwo, odpowiedzialność, Akademia Handlowa Nauk Stosowanych w Radomiu (2026), pp. 111–122, ISBN 978-83-68387-16-2: https://ksiegarnia.pwn.pl/Panstwo,-prawo-i-gospodarka-w-epoce-transformacji-technologicznej.-300317634.html
Who is criminally liable when an autonomous AI system commits a financial crime?
There is no clear answer yet: Bonca (2026, book chapter) finds criminal liability for generative and agentic AI only fragmentarily regulated, and the AI Act – Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 – contains no references to criminal liability related to AI (status as of 2026).
Polish law has no provisions explicitly addressing criminal liability for such systems or the attribution of blame (status as of 2026). Qualification is unproblematic when AI is merely a criminal's tool or the crime results from inadequate supervision of AI. Serious unresolved problems arise when an autonomous system commits a prohibited act, such as price-fixing without human involvement.
Source: The dual nature of generative AI and agentic AI tools in the financial sector, in: E. Żuchowska-Kotlarz, M. Mostowska, M. Majewska (eds.), Państwo, prawo i gospodarka w epoce transformacji technologicznej. Instytucje, bezpieczeństwo, odpowiedzialność, Akademia Handlowa Nauk Stosowanych w Radomiu (2026), pp. 111–122, ISBN 978-83-68387-16-2: https://ksiegarnia.pwn.pl/Panstwo,-prawo-i-gospodarka-w-epoce-transformacji-technologicznej.-300317634.html
How should financial institutions change risk management in response to AI?
Bonca (2026, book chapter) concludes that risk-management philosophy, operating principles and methods must change to cope with the dynamic development of technology.
According to the author, the main threat to financial systems is not primarily vulnerabilities, errors or slow human controls but inevitable battles between competing AI models ("AI versus AI"). Such models can test and correct each other but may also fight, leading to self-propelling cyber conflicts, while human oversight becomes impossible and wealthy firms with advanced AI could manipulate financial markets.
Limitations: Further research is needed on new risk-mitigation standards and a new risk–reward balance acceptable to a broad group of stakeholders.
“It is therefore necessary to change risk management philosophy and operating principles and methods to cope with the dynamic development of technology.” – Bonca (2026), p. 120
Source: The dual nature of generative AI and agentic AI tools in the financial sector, in: E. Żuchowska-Kotlarz, M. Mostowska, M. Majewska (eds.), Państwo, prawo i gospodarka w epoce transformacji technologicznej. Instytucje, bezpieczeństwo, odpowiedzialność, Akademia Handlowa Nauk Stosowanych w Radomiu (2026), pp. 111–122, ISBN 978-83-68387-16-2: https://ksiegarnia.pwn.pl/Panstwo,-prawo-i-gospodarka-w-epoce-transformacji-technologicznej.-300317634.html
Across the studies
Can blockchain users escape state law?
No: two studies by Bonca – on trust in blockchain transactions (2025, e-mentor) and on the Tornado Cash case (2026, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny) – describe the idea of "escaping from the law" through blockchain as a myth.
In real estate tokenisation, Bonca (2026, Studia i Materiały) concludes that if disintermediation is understood as an attempt to escape from the state, it does not take place. Bonca (2026, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny) adds that the trustless model reaches its limits when confronted with large-scale criminal exploitation, at which point recourse to legal institutions becomes unavoidable.
“The law does not exempt anyone conducting transactions on blockchains from criminal, civil, financial or administrative liability.” – Bonca (2025), p. 80
Sources: Will Tokenisation of the Economy Change the Foundations of Trust in Transactions? Selected Issues in the Context of Decentralised Public Blockchain Networks, e-mentor (2025): https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716; On-Chain Governance and Economic Sanctions Against Privacy-Preserving Software Code: The Tornado Cash Case, Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny (2026): https://doi.org/10.31743/ppe.19293; Disintermediation From the Perspective of Real Estate Token Economics [in Polish, with an English abstract], Studia i Materiały (2026): https://doi.org/10.7172/1733-9758.2026.44.3
Contact
How can I contact Bonca Lab?
You can contact Bonca Lab and Dr Mateusz A. Bonca by e-mail at mateusz_bonca@o2.pl.
The same e-mail address is given as the contact address in several of his scientific publications. He can also be contacted via LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mateusz-bonca/.
Sources: information provided by the author (25 October 2026); Bonca (2026), Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny, p. 27: https://doi.org/10.31743/ppe.19293; Bonca (2025), Nauki Ekonomiczne, p. 179: https://doi.org/10.19251/ne/2025.41(10)
How can I request a press comment from Bonca Lab?
Journalists can contact Dr Mateusz A. Bonca at mateusz_bonca@o2.pl, the same address as for all other enquiries.
He is open to providing comments for the media. There is no separate media contact address.
Source: information provided by the author (25 October 2026)
Citing the Lab's work
How should I cite Bonca Lab's research?
Please cite the published version (journal or monograph), using the DOI or ISBN where available.
Only the scientific publications presented in Deep research are intended for citation; Knowledge bites entries are not – they are for information only. For example, the article by Dr Mateusz A. Bonca published in e-mentor in 2025 has the DOI 10.15219/em110.1716.
Sources: information provided by the author (25 October 2026); Bonca Lab – Deep research: https://www.boncalab.com/deep-research; Bonca (2025), e-mentor: https://doi.org/10.15219/em110.1716
What is Dr Mateusz A. Bonca's ORCID iD?
Dr Mateusz A. Bonca's ORCID iD is 0009-0002-1529-5692 (https://orcid.org/0009-0002-1529-5692).
The identifier is listed on the Bonca Lab “Principal researcher” page. It is also given in the author information of his journal articles.
Sources: ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-1529-5692; Bonca Lab – Principal researcher: https://www.boncalab.com/principal-researcher
Research collaboration
Can I collaborate with Bonca Lab on research?
Yes: Dr Mateusz A. Bonca is open to joint research, co-authoring scientific publications, reviews and consultations, and talks and conference participation.
Collaboration enquiries can be sent to mateusz_bonca@o2.pl. He can also be contacted via LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mateusz-bonca/.
Source: information provided by the author (25 October 2026)